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Abstract
In this paper we investigate cooperative secure communications in a four-node cognitive radio network where
the secondary receiver is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. The secondary
user is allowed to transmit his own signals under the condition that the primary user’s secrecy rate and transmission
scheme are intact. Under this setting we derive the secondary user’s achievable rates and the related constraints to
guarantee the primary user’s weak secrecy rate, when Gelfand-Pinsker coding is used at the secondary transmitter.
In addition, we propose a multi-phase transmission scheme to include 1) the phases of the clean relaying with
cooperative jamming and 2) the latency to successfully decode the primary message at the secondary transmitter. A
capacity upper bound for the secondary user is also derived. Numerical results show that: 1) the proposed scheme
can outperform the traditional ones by properly selecting the secondary user’s parameters of different transmission
schemes according to the relative positions of the nodes; 2) the derived capacity upper bound is close to the
secondary user’s achievable rate within 0.3 bits/channel use, especially when the secondary transmitter/receiver is
far/close enough to the primary receiver/transmitter, respectively. Thereby, a smart secondary transmitter is able to
adapt its relaying and cooperative jamming to guarantee primary secrecy rates and to transmit its own data at the
same time from relevant geometric positions.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, communications are potentially subject to attacks, such as
passive eavesdropping or active jamming. In contrast to the traditional cryptographic approaches addressing these
attacks [1], there exists a promising direction towards achieving unconditional secure communications, namely
information-theoretic secrecy. The information-theoretic secrecy approach, initiated by Shannon [2] and developed
by Wyner [3], can exploit the randomness of the wireless channels to ensure the secrecy of the transmitted messages.
As a performance measure for communication systems with secrecy constraints, a secrecy rate is defined as a rate
at which the message can be transmitted reliably and securely between the legitimate nodes. However, similar to
communication networks without secrecy constraints, the overall performance is limited by the relative channel
qualities to guarantee secure communications. Many signal processing and multi-user techniques have therefore
been proposed to overcome this limitation such as the use of multiple antennas [4], [5], [6].
Recently, there has been a substantial interest in the secrecy of multi-user systems [7], with a particular emphasis
on potential cooperation between users to enhance the secrecy of communications. Cooperation in communication
networks is an emerging technique to improve the reliability of wireless communication systems, and it involves
multiple parties assisting each other in the transmission of messages, see e.g., [8]. Assuming that the cooperative
node(s) can be trusted and that they aim at increasing the secrecy of the original transmission in the presence
of a possible external eavesdropper, several cooperative strategies have been proposed [9], [10], [11], [12]. Many
works have considered the impact of different variants of interference injection, such as noise-forwarding [9],
cooperative jamming (CJ) [10], or interference assisted secure communications [13]. While CJ with Gaussian noise
has the advantage of simplicity, the non-decodability of the noisy signals are always hurting the legitimate receiver.
Consequently, more elaborate CJ strategies have been recently proposed [14] to mitigate this negative effect. The
second type corresponds to the classical sense of cooperation, where the cooperative nodes strengthen the main
transmission by using common relaying techniques such as decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-and-forward [11],
or compress-and-forward (CF) [15]. A comprehensive review of the main results for multi-user networks with
secrecy can be found in [7]. As one kind of cooperative communications schemes, cognitive radio technology has
been proposed by Mitola in [16] as an efficient way to enhance the spectrum efficiency which has considerable
3development over the last few decades. The state-of-the-art information theoretical analysis of cognitive radio
systems can be found in [17], [18]. The concept of cooperation for secrecy, and the corresponding cooperative
techniques can naturally be applied to the cognitive radio network.
In the present paper, we consider a four-node cognitive radio network where the secondary receiver is treated as
a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. In exchange of cooperation from the secondary
user to improve his own secrecy rate, the primary user allows the secondary user to share part of the spectrum.
Some important and related works are compared in the following. In [19], the secondary user wants to keep his
message confidential to the primary network. That is, the primary receiver is viewed as an eavesdropper from the
secondary network perspective. Hence the CR transmitter should make sure that the message is not leaked to the
primary receiver. In [20], the authors partially generalize the model of [19] by additionally considering the secrecy
of the primary message and derive the rate equivocation region of messages from both users. In [21] the authors
improve [20] by rate splitting: part of the message is transmitted by the primary transmitter with a deterministic
encoder, and the other part is transmitted by the cognitive transmitter with a stochastic encoder. The main difference
of our work to the aforementioned papers is that we additionally consider secure coexistence conditions to guarantee
the primary user’s secure transmission scheme is kept intact independently of the CR being active or not, which
can simplify the design of the legacy system and also broaden the applicable usage scenarios. However, when
considering these additional constraints, a deterministic encoder at the primary system [19], [21] with rate splitting
is incapable of guaranteeing the secrecy of the primary message. Furthermore, we investigate the inter-relation
between channels observed by the primary transmitter when the cognitive transmitter is active or not to guarantee
the secrecy constraint, which is a novel contribution compared to the cited papers.
4The main contributions1 of this work are summarized as follows:
1) We analyze a cognitive radio network with the conditions that the secrecy rate as well as the transmission
scheme of the primary network should be kept intact for discrete memoryless channels. One of the novel
applicable scenarios of the considered model is that the primary system has no capability of being cognitive
to the secondary users’ access and cannot adapt their transmission scheme accordingly, e.g., the commercial
systems nowadays. Thus, besides the achievable rate of the cognitive user2, we derive the additional rate
constraints to guarantee that the primary user’s weak secrecy is unchanged as well, which requires different
analysis compared to [19], [20], [21].
2) We then propose a multi-phase transmission scheme, which considers the following additional phases. First,
to accommodate the operations of practical systems, we take into account the first additional phase for
listening to/decoding the primary’s signal at the secondary transmitter. Second, we introduce another additional
phase as the third one to endow the cognitive system an extra degree of freedom for utilizing different
transmission schemes. For additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, this degree of freedom improves
the performance by exploiting pure relaying and jamming but not simultaneously transmitting cognitive user’s
own signal. The relaying in this interval is coined as clean relaying.
3) We derive a capacity upper bound (UB) for the secondary user under both discrete memoryless and AWGN
channels to evaluate the performance of the achievable scheme.
4) Finally, we illustrate our results through numerical examples based on a geometrical setup, which highlights
the impact of the node geometry on the achievable rates and on the optimal power allocation and time splitting
1There are three main differences of the journal version to the previous conference version [22]: 1) We additionally derive the cognitive
user’s rate with dirty paper coding for discrete memoryless and AWGN channels, which treats the primary user’s signal as a non-causally
known side information. 2) We additionally derive a capacity upper bound of the considered model and compare the upper and lower bounds
via numerical results. The derived capacity upper bound is close to the achievable rate of the secondary user within 0.3 bits/channel use,
especially when the secondary transmitter/receiver is far/close enough to the primary receiver/transmitter, respectively. 3) We additionally
investigate a 4-phase scheme in which the relaying signal and jamming signal are transmitted in different phases, i.e., the third and fourth
phases, respectively, to validate the choice of the proposed 3-phase scheme.
2In this paper we use cognitive user and secondary user interchangeably.
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Fig. 1: Multi-phase transmission scheme: (J) refers to jamming, (1) to w1 and (2) to w2. Green indicates a positive
effect (e.g. jamming, relaying) while red indicates a negative effect (e.g. interference, eavesdropping).
of the secondary transmitter. Numerical results show that 1) the proposed 3-phase clean relaying scheme3
indeed improves the cognitive user’s rate; 2) the proposed achievable scheme is close to capacity when the
secondary transmitter/receiver is far/close enough to the primary receiver/transmitter, respectively.
Notation: In this paper, upper case normal alphabet denotes random variables, lower and upper case bold alphabets
denote vectors and random vectors, respectively. The mutual information between two random variables is denoted
by I(; ). E[.] denotes the expectation; H(.) and h(.) denote the entropy and differential entropy, respectively. sup
and inf denote supremum and infimum, respectively, C(x) , log(1 + x) and a+ , max(0, a).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce our system model. In Section III we describe
the transmission scheme and derive the achievable secrecy rates for different signaling strategies. In Section IV
we derive the capacity upper bound of the secondary user. Our theoretical results are illustrated through numerical
simulations in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We investigate the cognitive radio channel with confidential message (CRC-CM) at the primary user described
in Fig. 1, which consists of the following single antenna half-duplex nodes: the primary/secondary (cognitive)
transmitters T1/T2 with finite channel input alphabets X1 and X2, respectively, and the primary/secondary receivers
U1/U2 4 with finite channel output alphabets Y1 and Y2, respectively. T1 wishes to transmit the secret message w1
3In the following, we name the complete transmission scheme where the third phase uses the clean relay as the 3-phase clean relaying
scheme.
4Please note that we use the italic alphabets U1 and U2 to denote the auxiliary random variables in Appendix.
6to U1, which should be kept secret from U2. Meanwhile, T2 wants to transmit the message w2 (without secrecy
constraints) to U2. In this work we consider the following two requirements coined as the secure coexistence
conditions inherited from [23], which considers the coexistence conditions without the secrecy constraint.
Definition 1. The secure coexistence conditions require
(i) the transmission of T2 does not degrade the primary user’s secrecy rate RS1, and
(ii) the encoder and decoder at T1 and U1, respectively, are left intact whether T2 transmits or not.
The reasons to consider the secure coexistence conditions are twofold. First, to utilize the time-frequency slot
in the overlay sense, cognitive radio systems are obligated not to interfere the primary systems, which is common
in cognitive radio systems design. Second, with the condition (ii), cognitive radios are backward compatible to
the legacy systems, which cannot sense and adapt to the environment agilely. This condition makes the cognitive
radio capable of operating in broader scenarios. Note that the above conditions are the main differences between
our model and those in [19] [20] [21]. Furthermore, to attain the result, the derivations to accommodate the secure
coexistence conditions require different analysis.
One of the possible practical scenarios of the considered model is that, the primary users belong to a licensed
system, who sells rights of the spectrum usage to a femtocell system. Here we can let the secondary transmitter
and receiver be the femtocell base station and users, respectively. However, the femtocell operator may not be able
to guarantee that the femtocell users are malicious or not. Thus, to provide a secrecy transmission to the primary
users, not only the primary base station needs to use the wiretap coding, but also the femtocell base station needs
to help to maintain that secrecy transmission for the primary system. These considerations are included into the
secure coexistence conditions and will be discussed in detail later.
Denote Y ′1/Y ′2 and Y1/Y2 as the received signals at U1/U2 when T2 transmits or not, respectively. A discrete
memoryless CRC-CM is described as
P (y′1,y
′
2|x1,x2) =
n
Π
k=1
P (y′1,k, y
′
2,k|x1,k, x2,k), (1)
where the subscript k denotes the k-th symbol, x1 ∈ X n1 and x2 ∈ X n2 are channel inputs from T1 and T2,
respectively; y′1 ∈ Yn1 and y′2 ∈ Yn2 are channel outputs at U1 and U2, respectively, when T2 transmits. The
7primary transmitter T1 intends to send a message W1 ∈ W1 = {1, · · · , 2nRS1} to U1 in n channel uses. A
(2nRS1 , n) primary user’s code is a choice of encoding and decoding rules
En1 : {1, · · · , 2nRS1} → X n1 , and Dn1 : Yn1 → {1, · · · , 2nRS1}.
The weak secrecy rate RS1 is achievable for the primary user for the wiretap channel if there exists a sequence of
(2nRS1 , n) codes such that the following two constraints are satisfied
lim
n→∞
1
2nRS1
2nRS1∑
w1=1
Pr[Dn1 (Y
′
1 ) 6= w1|w1 is sent]→ 0,
lim
n→∞
(
RS1 − 1
n
H(W1|Y ′2 )
)
→ 0+. (2)
In the considered cognitive radio system, the primary user should not be required to change his encoder and
decoder due to the presence of secondary users. Therefore, T1 and U1 are restricted to use the usual wiretap encoder
and decoder, which are designed for a three-node wiretap channel: one legitimate transmitter, one legitimate receiver,
and one eavesdropper. The secrecy rate RS1 that can be achieved under this condition is defined as a single-user
achievable secrecy rate. On the other hand, T2 intends to send an independent message W2 ∈ W2 = {1, · · · , 2nR2}
to the secondary receiver U2 in n channel uses with the following encoding and decoding rules
En2 : E
n
1 ×W1 ×W2 → X n2 and Dn2 : Y ′n2 →W2.
A rate R2 is achievable for the secondary user if there exists a sequence of (2nR2 , n) codes such that
lim
n→∞
1
2nR2
2nR2∑
w2=1
Pr[Dn2 (Y
′
2 ) 6= w2|w2 is sent]→ 0, (3)
while satisfying the secure coexistence conditions.
III. TRANSMISSION SCHEMES AND ACHIEVABLE RATE REGIONS
In this section we first discuss our main results which include the secondary user’s achievable rate in discrete
memoryless channels (DMC) with corresponding constraints to guarantee the primary user’s security and the
extension to multi-phase transmission. Then we investigate different transmission schemes and their corresponding
8achievable rate pairs in AWGN channels. We proposed a 3-phase clean relaying scheme combined with dirty paper
coding (DPC)5 and cooperative jamming with numerical assessments in the next section.
A. 3-Phase Clean Relaying Scheme with Gelfand-Pinsker Coding
In this section we discuss the case where T2 uses GPC to precode T1’s signal.
1) Single Phase Transmission for DMC: To guarantee the secrecy of the primary user’s transmission when T2
exploits GPC, we need to derive the reliability and analyze the equivocation rate of the achievable scheme, but not
directly apply GPC to precode the primary user’s signal as the traditional interference mitigation based cognitive
radio without secrecy constraint [23]. Denote the auxiliary random variables transmitted by T1 and T2 as V1 and
V2, respectively. The main result is then given as follows.
Theorem 1. Assume T2 non-causally knows V n1 and the primary user’s coding scheme is fixed with rate RS1 ,
I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;Y2) and the rate per bin is R′S1 , I(V1;Y2)− 2ε. Then the rate R2 is achievable such that the
secure coexistence conditions are satisfied, where
R2 = max
pV2|V1 , pX2|V2,V1
I(V2;Y
′
2)− I(V2;V1), (4)
s.t.


RS1 ≤ I(V1;Y ′1)−R′S1, (5)
R′S1 = I(V1;V2, Y
′
2 ). (6)
The proof is derived in Appendix I. The additional constraints (5) and (6) can be explained intuitively as follows:
(5) ensures that once T2 transmits, the equivalent main channel can support the transmission of the primary’s code
such that U1 can successfully decode all of the 2n[RS1+R
′
S1] codewords with negligible error, while (6) guarantees
the secrecy, i.e., the wiretap code sent by T1 to U2 can be supported by the new channel when T2 transmits in the
sense that, given W1 = w1, U2 is able to find one codeword which is jointly typical to the received signal. Therefore,
U2 will be completely confused and the information leakage due to the use of GPC at T2 can be mitigated.
Remark 1. Note that due to the secure coexistence conditions, the rate expression in Theorem 1 is different to
those in the cognitive interference channels [7], [20]. First, here condition (6) is additionally required to guarantee
that the primary user’s original secrecy rate I(V1;Y1) − I(V1;Y2) is achievable. Second, our rate expression is
5When considering AWGN channel, we use dirty paper coding (DPC) to replace Gelfand-Pinsker Coding (GPC), which is optimal for
perfect channel state information at the transmitter.
9composed of two channel models, i.e., the cases where either T2 transmits or not, which cannot be specialized from
[7], [20].
Remark 2. Note that we cannot simplify the constraint by substituting (6) into (5). The reason is as follows. Recall
that we describe the binning codebook of wiretap codes by two dimensions (or indices): bin indices (or rows)
denote the secured message and the codewords in each bin (or columns) are to confuse T2. More specifically, the
left hand side (LHS) of (6) is the number of codewords representing the same message, which is fixed at T1. If
we simplify the constraint by doing so, we will have a constraint only on the target secrecy rate. However, the
transmission at that rate may not be secure in the weak sense. This is because without such constraint, there is no
enough codewords representing the same message to confuse the eavesdropper T2.
Remark 3. Since single binning is used in the primary user’s codebook and must be left intact by the cognitive
users, during the analysis of the equivocation rate the derivation of H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1) need further analysis than
cases in which V1 belong to a double binning codebook when GPC is used, e.g., [24], [25]. More specifically, in
the latter case, the remaining uncertainty of V1 given V2 can be simply derived by removing one of the sub bin
indices. On the contrary, here we need to derive a tight upper bound of H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1) to guarantee a larger
cognitive user’s rate. Please refer to Appendix II for a more detailed discussion.
2) Three-Phase Transmission for DMC: The motivations of the three-phase transmission scheme are twofold: 1)
To provide an additional degree of freedom by different transmission schemes to improve the secondary user’s rate
depending on the location of nodes and their channels; 2) To take into account the latency of successful decoding
of w1 at T2 to accommodate the practical scenarios where w1 cannot be known non-causally at T2.
In the following we extend the result in Theorem 1 to a three-phase transmission, where the distribution of each
phase can be respectively factorized from (1) as follows
PY ′1 (1), Y ′2 (1), V1 = PY ′1 (1), Y ′2 (1)|V1PV1 ,
P
Y ′1
(2), Y ′2
(2), X
(2)
2 , V1,V2
= P
Y ′1
(2), Y ′2
(2)|X(2)2 , V1
P
X
(2)
2 |V1, V2
PV2|V1PV1 ,
P
Y ′1
(3), Y ′2
(3),X
(3)
2 , V1
= P
Y ′1
(3), Y ′2
(3)|X(3)2 , V1
P
X
(3)
2 |V1
PV1 ,
where the notation A(k) denotes random variable A in the k−th phase. Note that distributions of V1 and V2 are
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fixed over the three phases, thus we omit the specification of the phase to simplify the notation.
Assume the time index t ∈ N. We define the sets of the three phases as T1 = {t : 1 ≤ t ≤ ⌊η1n⌋}, T2 =
{t : ⌊η1n⌋ + 1 ≤ t ≤ ⌊(η1 + η2)n⌋}, T3 = {t : ⌊(η1 + η2)n⌋ + 1 ≤ t ≤ n}, respectively, with η1 + η2 + η3 =
1, 0 < η1 < 1, 0 ≤ η2, 0 ≤ η3. Note that ⌊η1n⌋ must be no less than the time that T2 needs to successfully decode
w1 [26] and η1 must be less than 1 for T2’s own transmission, i.e., a nonzero duration of the second phase. The
former condition can be modeled by letting T1, T2, and U1 form a degraded wiretap channel6. Besides, these ratios
are fixed before each transmission according to the optimization results which will be discussed at the end of this
section. We want to design T2’s transmit signal x2 where the secure coexistence conditions are satisfied and we
consider the weak secrecy constraint.
Proposition 1. Assume that the primary user’s coding scheme is fixed with code rate RS1 , I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;Y2),
the rate per bin is R′S1 , I(V1;Y2)− 2ε, and T1, T2, and U1 form a degraded wiretap channel. Then rate R2 is
achievable such that the reliable decoding and the weak secrecy can be guaranteed where
R2 = max
pV2|V1 , pX2|V2,V1
η2
(
I(V2;Y
′(2)
2 )− I(V2;V1)
)
, (7)
s.t.


RS1 +R
′
S1 ≤
3∑
k=1
ηkI(V1;Y
′(k)
1 ), (8)
R′S1=η1I(V1;Y
′(1)
2 )+η2I(V1;V2, Y
′
2
(2)
)+η3I(V1;Y
′(3)
2 ). (9)
The result in Proposition 1 can be derived by applying the concept of parallel channels [27] such that the
achievable secrecy rate takes the average over the considered three transmission phases in addition with the fact
that V2 only exists in the second phase. Thus the proof is omitted.
3) Three-phase Transmission for AWGN Channels: The three-phase transmission for AWGN channels is ex-
plained as follows:
Phase 1 (t ∈ T1): The following decodability constraint is required [26]
|cTT | > |c11|, (10)
which can be easily seen from the degradedness assumption of Y1 and YT . In the following we normalize |c11| to
1.
6Here we consider the stochastic degradedness [15], i.e., there exists a random variable Y˜T denoting the received signal at T2 such that
1) Y˜T |{X = x} ∼ pY˜T |X(y˜T |x), and 2) X → Y˜T → Y1 form a Markov chain.
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Phase 2 (t ∈ T2): the transmit power of T2 in this phase P (2)2 is divided into three parts:
1) Jamming: the jamming signal a2(t) has power P (2)2a = ρ2P (2)2 to confuse the eavesdropping secondary user
U2. The parameter ρ2 ∈ [0, 1) denotes the fraction of the power used for jamming.
2) Relaying of the primary message: If (10) is valid, T2 helps to relay {x1(t)}t∈T2 in Phase 2 while simulta-
neously transmitting its own message w2. The relay power is P (2)2,1 = γ(1− ρ2)P (2)2 , where γ is the ratio of
the remaining power for relaying.
3) Transmission of the secondary message: w2 is encoded into v(2)2 with power (1 − γ)(1 − ρ2)P (2)2 to be
decoded by U2 only.
Phase 3 (t ∈ T3): T2 relays {x1(t)}t∈T3 with power (1 − ρ3)P (3)2 and transmits the jamming signal with power
ρ3P
(3)
2 , but without super-imposing its own signal v2(t).
The average transmit power constraints for Tk, are
1
n
n∑
i=1
|xk(i)|2 ≤ Pk for k ∈ {1, 2}. (11)
More specifically, the transmit power constraint at T2 is
η2P
(2)
2 + η3P
(3)
2 ≤ P2, (12)
where P (k)2 , 1|Tk|
∑
t∈Tk |x2(t)|2, k = 2 and 3.
Assume that the noises at all nodes are independent and identically distributed circularly symmetric complex
AWGN with zero mean, unit variance and are mutually independent for all t. We also assume that T1 perfectly
knows the channel states from T1 to U1 and from T1 to U2, while T2 knows all channel states. Note that when
|cTT | ≤ 1, T2 cannot know what is transmitted due to the wiretap code used at T1. On the contrary, if |cTT | > 1,
T2 can accomplish the successful decoding in the same way as at the legitimate receiver U1, since |cTT | is large
enough for T2 to decode all the codewords in the binning codebook successfully.7
7The celebrated Shannons random codebook is adopted in our paper, which guarantees the existence of codebook with decodable w1 in
Phase 1 as in the seminal papers [28][29].
12
When T2 does not transmit, the secrecy capacity of the primary user is
(C(P1)− C(|c12|2P1))+. Define
c
(2)
11 , 1 + c21e
−jφ21
√
(1− ρ2)γP (2)2 /P1, c(2)12 , c12 + c22e−jφ21
√
(1− ρ2)γP (2)2 /P1, (13)
c
(3)
11 , 1 + c21e
−jφ21
√
(1− ρ3)P (3)2 /P1, c(3)12 , c12 + c22e−jφ21
√
(1− ρ3)P (3)2 /P1, (14)
where φ21 is the phase of c21. The secondary user’s rate with DPC is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the primary user’s coding scheme is fixed with rate RS1 =
(C(P1)− C(|c12|2P1))+.
When DPC is used at T2, the rate R2 is achievable such that the secure coexistence conditions can be guaranteed
where
R2 = η2C
(
|c22|2PU2
1 + |c22|2ρ2P (2)2
)
, (15)
if (10) and the following constraints
η2C
(
|c(2)11 |2P1
1 + |c21|2(ρ2P (2)2 + PU2)
)
+ η3C
(
|c(3)11 |2P1
1 + |c21|2ρ3P (3)2
)
≥ (1− η1)C(P1), (16)
η2C
(
|c(2)12 |2P1
1 + |c22|2(ρ2P (2)2 + PU2)
)
+ η3C
(
|c(3)12 |2P1
1 + |c22|2ρ3P (3)2
)
= (1− η1)C(|c12|2P1), (17)
are fulfilled, where PU2 , (1− ρ2)(1− γ)P (2)2 .
The proof is derived in Appendix III.
Based on Proposition 1 and the fact that a smaller η1 results in a longer duration for transmitting the secondary
user’s signal and clean relaying, we set η1 = C(P1)/C(|cTT |2P1), where ⌊η1n⌋ is the smallest duration for T2 to
successfully decode T1’s message. We then define the optimization problem for this case as
P1: max
η2, ρ2, ρ3, γ, P
(2)
2 ,P
(3)
2
R2 (18)
s.t. (10), (16), (17) and


η2P
(2)
2 + (1− η1 − η2)P (3)2 ≤ P2, P (2)2 ≥ 0, P (3)2 ≥ 0 (19)
ρ2 ≥ 0, ρ3 ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 (20)
η2 + η3 = 1− η1, η2 ≥ 0, η3 ≥ 0, (21)
where the first inequality in (19) is the average power constraint. Instead of focusing on solving the non-convex
P1, we will thoroughly investigate it with numerical illustrations in Section V and investigate the impact of the
optimization variables on the rates for relevant scenarios.
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Remark 4. Note that due to the secure coexistence condition (i), pure cooperative jamming cannot be used here.
This is because, there are 2n(I(V1;Y1)−ε) codewords in the primary user’s codebook which is fixed, and U1 must be
able to successfully decode all the codewords. When pure CJ is used, the capacity of the main channel becomes
I(V1;Y
′
1) which is smaller than I(V1;Y1). Then the reliability constraint of the transmission to the legitimate
receiver T1 is invalid.
Remark 5. It is interesting to see whether transmitting relay and jamming signals separately by different phases
improves the performance or not, comparing to the proposed 3-phase scheme where both signals are transmitted
in the third phase. We conjecture that the proposed 3-phase scheme does not perform worse than schemes with
4-phase. We first sketch the steps to identify this question as follows. Firstly, we extend the optimization problem P1
into four phases to encompass phases for pure relay and pure jamming. By comparing R1 solving from three and
four-phase schemes numerically, we can observe that only one of the third and forth phases of the 4-phase scheme is
selected. This means the proposed 3-phase scheme performs the same as the the four-phase one under the considered
scenario. The detailed derivation is as follows. Due to the intractability of the optimization problems, we mainly
show the performance of the 4-phase scheme numerically complemented with thorough qualitative discussions. The
DMC rate of the cognitive user with a 4-phase transmission scheme can be expressed as
R2 = max
pV2|V1 , pX2|V2,V1
η2
(
I(V2;Y
′(2)
2 )− I(V2;V1)
)
, (22)
s.t.


R1 +R
′
1 ≤
4∑
k=1
ηkI(V1;Y
′(k)
1 ), (23)
R′1=η1I(V1;Y
′(1)
2 )+η2I(V1;V2, Y
′
2
(2)
)+η3I(V1;Y
′(3)
2 ) +η4I(V1;Y
′(4)
2 ). (24)
To compare schemes with 3- and 4-phases in AWGN cases, we first evaluate the terms in the third and fourth
phases in (23) and (24) as follows, where we assume that in the third phase we only relay but do not transmit
jamming signals and in the fourth phase we only transmit the jamming signals but do not relay:
η′3I(V1;Y
′(3)
1 ) + η4I(V1;Y
′(4)
1 ) = η
′
3C(|c(3)11 (0, P ′(3)2 )|2P1) + η4C
(
P1
1 + |c21|2P (4)2
)
, (25)
η′3I(V1;Y
′(3)
2 ) + η4I(V1;Y
′(4)
2 ) = η
′
3C(|c(3)12 (0, P ′(3)2 )|2P1) + η4C
(
|c12|2P1
1 + |c22|2P (4)2
)
, (26)
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where c(3)11 (ρ, P ) , 1 + c21e−jφ21
√
(1−ρ)P
P1
and c(3)12 (ρ, P ) , c12 + c22e−jφ21
√
(1−ρ)P
P1
are equivalent channels;
P
′(3)
2 is the CR power used in the third phase of the 4-phase scheme; P (3)2 is the CR power used in the third phase
of the 3-phase scheme.
Similarly, we use η′3 to distinguish the third phase of the 4-phase scheme from η3 of the 3-phase scheme. Recall
that ρ3 is the power ratio for jamming in the third phase. We also restate the third phase in the corresponding
constraints in the 3-phase scheme as follows for the convenience of comparison
η3I(V1;Y
′(3)
1 ) = η3C
(
|c(3)11 (ρ3, P (3)2 )|2P1
1 + |c21|2ρ3P (3)2
)
, (27)
η3I(V1;Y
′(3)
2 ) = η3C
(
|c(3)12 (ρ3, P (3)2 )|2P1
1 + |c22|2ρ3P (3)2
)
. (28)
From the above we can express the primary user’s sum secrecy rate of the third phase and the fourth phase by the
4-phase scheme as
R
(3,4)
1,4PH =η
′
3
{
C(|c(3)11 (0, P ′(3)2 )|2P1)− C(|c(3)12 (0, P ′(3)2 )|2P1)
}
+
η4
{
C
(
P1
1 + |c21|2P (4)2
)
− C
(
|c12|2P1
1 + |c22|2P (4)2
)}
. (29)
And the primary user’s rate of the last phase, i.e., the third phase, by the 3-phase scheme is restated as
R
(3)
1,3PH = η3
{
C
(
|c(3)11 (ρ3, P (3)2 )|2P1
1 + |c21|2ρ3P (3)2
)
− C
(
|c(3)12 (ρ3, P (3)2 )|2P1
1 + |c22|2ρ3P (3)2
)}
. (30)
To compare the optimal R(3,4)1,4PH and R
(3)
1,3PH under the same parameters in the first and second phases, we need
to impose the following two constraints
η′3P
′(3)
2 + η4P
(4)
2 = η3P
(3)
2 , (31)
η′3 + η4 = η3 = 1− η1 − η2, (32)
where 0 < η1 < 1 and 0 < η2 < 1 are predefined and fixed.
Then we check that whether the additional fourth phase in (29) provides a performance gain, i.e.,
(R
(3,4)
1,4PH)
∗
?
≷ (R(3)1,3PH)
∗, (33)
where (R(3)1,3PH)∗ = maxρ3,P (3)2 R
(3)
1,3PH , s.t. (31), (32) and (R(3,4)1,4PH)∗ = maxη′3,P (3)2 R
(3,4)
1,4PH , s.t. (31), (32).
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It is clear that (29) and (30) are not convex and it is hard to have an analytical solution. We resort to numerical
method to answer (33). After enumerating different locations of the nodes and different transmit power constraints,
we find that (R(3,4)1,4PH)∗ = (R(3)1,3PH)∗. From the numerical result we observe that the optimized rates of the two
schemes are the same. In addition, we can find that η′3 can only be 0 or η3. In particular, in the part above the blue
line, η′3 = η3 and below the blue line, η′3 = 0. That means in total there will be always only three phases. Therefore,
the proposed 3-phase scheme shows the same performance as always the 4-phase scheme. From numerical results
we also observe that the achievable rates of the two schemes are identical.
Even though the above discussion is not a rigorous proof, based on it we reasonably conjecture that the 4-phase
scheme does not outperform the proposed one.
B. 3-Phase Clean Relaying scheme without GPC
We can easily specialize our previous result to the scenario where T2 does not use GPC. In this section we will
show that a stronger secrecy measure than the commonly used one, i.e., the variational distance [30] defined by
sup |PWY2 − PWPY2 | ≤ ε can be achieved without rate loss at the secondary user compared to the weak secrecy.
We first derive the three-phase secrecy rate under this stronger secrecy measure.
Theorem 2. For the three-phase transmission, the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel
under variational distance constraint can be represented as
Cs = sup
{(U (k),X(k)1 )}∈P
3∑
k=1
ηk
{
I(U (k);Y
(k)
1 )− I(U (k);Y (k)2 )
}
, (34)
where P , {(U (k), X(k)1 ) : U (k) → X(k)1 → Y (k)1 Y (k)2 forms a Markov chain, k = 1, 2, 3 and 1nΣnj=1|xj |2 ≤ P1}.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix IV.
In the following we consider the 3-phase clean relaying scheme combined with cooperative jamming as described
in Section III-A3. From Theorem 2 we can find that the enhancement of the secrecy level does not cause any loss
of secrecy capacity.
Proposition 3. Assume the primary user’s coding scheme is fixed with rate RS1 =
(C(P1)− C(|c12|2P1))+. Without
using DPC at T2, the rate R2 is achievable while the reliable decoding and the secrecy measure of variational
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distance can be guaranteed, where
R2 ≤ max η2 C

 |c22|2(1− ρ2)(1− γ)P (2)2
1 + |c22|2ρ2P (2)2 +
∣∣∣c(2)12 ∣∣∣2 P1

 (35)
s.t.

η2

C


∣∣∣c(2)11 ∣∣∣2 P1
1 + |c21|2(1− γ + γρ2)P (2)2

− C


∣∣∣c(2)12 ∣∣∣2 P1
1 + |c22|2ρ2P (2)2




+ η3

C


∣∣∣c(3)11 ∣∣∣2 P1
1 + |c21|2ρ3P (3)2

− C


∣∣∣c(3)12 ∣∣∣2 P1
1 + |c22|2ρ3P (3)2






+
≥ (1− η1)RS1. (36)
The proof of Proposition 3 follows the steps from Appendix III and is therefore omitted here. Without DPC, the
optimization problem P1 simplifies into P2 as:
P2: max
η2, ρ2, ρ3, γ, P
(2)
2 ,P
(3)
2
R2 s.t. (10), (19), (20), (21).
IV. UPPER BOUND ANALYSIS
In this section we derive an upper bound for the channel in Fig. 1. In particular, we first analyze the discrete
memoryless channels in Section IV-A and then extend it to the AWGN channels in Section IV-B.
A. Upper Bound for Discrete Memoryless Channels
The upper bound of the considered channel for discrete memoryless cases is given in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. If the signal received at U2 is a degraded version to that at U1, the capacity-equivocation region
outer bound is given by
CDMCo =
⋃
U→X1→Y1→Y2,
(U,V )→X2→(Y1,Y2)


(R1, R2, Re1) ∈ R3+ :
Re1 ≤ R1
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(V ;Y2)
Re1 ≤ I(X1;Y1|V )− I(X1;Y2|V )


.
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The proof is derived in Appendix V.
The secrecy rate upper bound of the primary user can be expressed as
RS1 = min{Re1, R1}, (37)
where
R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(V ;Y2)}, (38)
which can be easily derived from Theorem 1. In addition, since I(X1;Y2|V ) > 0, we know that
RS1 = min{I(X1;Y1|V )− I(X1;Y2|V ), I(U ;Y1)}. (39)
Meanwhile, the upper bound of R2 can be derived as8
R2 ≤ min{I(V ;Y2), I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(V ;Y2)−RS1, target} = I(V ;Y2)− (RS1, target − I(X1;Y1|V ))+. (40)
B. Upper Bound for AWGN Channels
In the following we derive the capacity outer bound for AWGN channels.
Theorem 4. If the signal received at U2 is a degraded version to that at U1, the outer bound of the rate pair
(Rs1, R2) is given by
(Rs1, R2) =
⋃
0≤α,β,δ,η,γ≤1,
|ρ|≤1


Rs1 ≤ min
{
log
(
1+P˜1+|a|2P˜2+2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1+α(P˜1+|a|2P˜2+2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
,(
log
(
1+γ(P˜1+|a|2P˜2+2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1+β(|b|2P˜1+P˜2+2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log
(
1+η|a|2P˜2
1+δP˜1
))+}
R2 ≤
{
log
(
1+|b|2P˜1+P˜2+2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1+β(|b|2P˜1+P˜2+2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
−(
log
(
1+P˜1
1+|b|2P˜2
)
− log
(
1+γ(P˜1+|a|2P˜2+2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1+η|a|2P˜2
))+}


,
where P˜1 , |H11|2P1, P˜2 , |H22|2P2, ρ , E[H11X1(H22X2)∗]/
√
P˜1P˜2 is the correlation coefficient.
The proof is derived in Appendix VI.
To compare the above UB to our existing lower bound, we need the following steps. To find the upper bound of
the cognitive user’s rate, we set the upper bound of RS1 , namely ROS1 , to be the same as the primary user’s target
8With abuse of notation, here we use RS1, target to denote the primary user’s target secrecy rate, which has the same meaning as the one
in (2), but is different to the one in (39).
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secrecy rate, namely, RS1, target, due to the secure coexistence condition (i). From numerical results we can find
a set of (α, β, δ, η, γ, ρ), namely, S such that the equality ROS1 = RS1, target is valid. Then we can find the outer
bound of the cognitive radio user’s rate as
Ro2 = max
(α,β,δ,η,γ,ρ)∈S
log
(
1 + |b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
−
(
log
(
1 + P˜1
1 + |b|2P˜2
)
− log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1 + η|a|2P˜2
))+
. (41)
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we investigate thoroughly the optimization problems P1 and P2 using numerical illustrations based
on a relevant scenario. We first describe our geometrical setup in Section V-A. We then analyze the performance of
our 3-phase clean relaying scheme, with and without DPC encoding at T2 in Section V-B. After that we study the
influence of the optimization parameters to highlight some interesting behavior in Section V-C. Finally we compare
the achievable rate and the capacity upper bound of the secondary user.
A. Setup
For our numerical illustrations of the theoretical results, we are interested in the system behavior for different
locations of the secondary transmitter. In particular we fix the locations of the primary transmitter T1 and receiver
U1 at the coordinates (0, 0) and (1, 0), respectively. The secondary receiver is fixed at (1,−1). We assume a path-
loss model with path-loss exponent α = 3, i.e., cij = d−3ij . The power constraints at T1 is P1 = 10 dB while we
will consider different transmission powers at T2 in order to measure the impact of the power constraint. Note that
we also include power control as a possible design parameter for T2, i.e., the transmission power utilized is not
necessarily fixed to its maximum P2. The unit of rate results is bit per channel use. Note that we use the solver
fmincon from Matlab to solve the optimization problem numerically. Because fmincon is a derivative-based search
algorithm, it cannot guarantee a global optimal solution for the considered problems, which are non-convex.
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Fig. 2: (a) Maximum achievable secondary user’s rates R(DPC20dB)2 as a function of the position of T2 with P2 = 20
dB. (b)Difference between maximum achievable secondary user’s rates with and without DPC (R(DPC20dB)2 and
R
(CR20dB)
2 ) as a function of the position of T2 with P2 = 20 dB.
B. Performance Analysis
1) Performance of the 3-phase clean relaying scheme with DPC (P1):
In this section we investigate the performance of the proposed scheme. First we depict in Fig. 2a the maximum
achievable secondary user’s rates R2 for the problem P1, i.e., for the 3-phase clean relaying scheme combined
with DPC at T2. In all figures, the x-axis combined with the y-axis represents the coordinate of T2 in the
plane. The brighter the point (x, y) is, the higher the value of the depicted variable is for this location of
T2. We observe from Fig. 2a that the highest secondary user’s rates are attained for T2 located between T1
and U1. Interestingly the highest rates are not obtained for T2 located close to U2 which can be explained in
two ways. First due to the decodability condition, the location of T2 is bounded inside the circle around T1
with radius as the distance between T1 and U1. Second, since T2 must maintain the secrecy rate unchanged,
it is primordial that T2 helps the primary transmission in the classical relaying sense, for which the optimal
location of T2 is between T1 and U1.
2) Comparison with 3-phase clean relaying scheme without DPC (P2):
In order to evaluate the gain from combining DPC with 3-phase clean relaying scheme, we depict in Fig.
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Fig. 3: Difference of maximum achievable secondary user’s rates between different schemes and different transmit
powers as a function of the position of T2.
2b the difference of the maximum achievable secondary user’s rates achieved between the optimizations P1
and P2. We observe that the 3-phase clean relaying scheme with DPC provides gains up to 140% comparing
with scheme without DPC, especially when T2 is located closer to T1.
3) Comparison with the baseline scheme (without the third phase) and a 4-phase scheme:
In Fig. 3 we compare the 3-phase clean relaying scheme with DPC to the baseline scheme with the single-phase
(labeled as SP in the figure) transmission. Here single-phase is defined as the one without clean relaying but still
has the first phase for listening and decoding the primary message. As expected, the secondary user’s rates obtained
from the optimization P1 are no worse than the rates without the clean relaying phase, which was expected since
the single-phase transmission scheme is a special case of the 3-phase clean relaying scheme with η3 = 0. More
specifically, from Fig. 3 we can observe that the gain becomes significantly higher when T2 is located between
T1 and U1. This observation is consistent to the intuition since when T2 is at such location, the clean relaying
in Phase 3 is highly efficient: it will boost the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) of I(V1;Y (3)1 ) much
faster than the relaying in Phase 2 because T2 is close to U1. More specifically, under this geometry, in Phase 2 the
signal U2 causes more interference to U1, and thus degrades the efficiency of relaying. Meanwhile the increment
on the SINR of I(V1;Y (3)2 ) is limited due to T2 being far enough from U2. Also in the same region, the power
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allocated to the jamming signal can be reduced also due to T2 being far enough from U2, which further improves
the performance in this region.
In this subsection we also compare the proposed three-phase scheme to a four-phase scheme in which the relayed
and jamming signals are separated in the third and fourth phases, respectively. The characterization of the four-
phase scheme can be straightforwardly extended from our three-phase scheme. Therefore, we omit the derivation
here. By this comparison we aim to verify that the latter one does not provide any additional degree of freedom
to improve R2. From numerical result observe that η3 can only be 0 or 1. In particular, in the part above the blue
line, η3 = 1 and below the blue line, η3 = 0. That means in total there will be only three phases. Therefore, the
proposed three-phase scheme is no worse than the four-phase scheme for the considered setup.
C. Relation between the Optimized Parameters and Geo-locations
In this section we investigate our transmission schemes by illustrating some optimized parameters with respect to
geo-locations. In particular we discuss the influence of two important parameters, namely the maximal transmission
power of the secondary transmitter P2 and the interval of the third phase η3.
1) Influence of the secondary power P2: We first investigate the influence of the maximal transmission power
of T2. In particular we study the 3-phase clean relaying scheme with DPC and single-phase transmission
in Fig. 3 with P2 = 20dB and P2 = 30dB. While we observe a somewhat similar geographic behavior
for both schemes, there is an important difference between them. Indeed the magnitude of the difference
R
(DPC30dB)
2 − R(DPC20dB)2 is significantly higher than that of the difference R(SP30dB)2 − R(SP20dB)2 . This behavior
shows that higher secondary transmission power are still beneficial when the 3-phase clean relaying scheme
with DPC is used, while increasing the transmission power without the clean relaying phase is not efficient
to enhance the rate.
2) Influence of the third phase η3:
We also investigate the interval of the third phase for clean relaying depending on whether DPC is implemented
or not, in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Our results highlight two important facts: First for both schemes, the 3-phase
clean relaying scheme will be used more often when T2 gets closer to T1. This observation must be put
in conjunction with the fact that η1 is getting smaller while T2 gets closer to T1, which allows a longer
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period for clean relaying. Secondly, from the difference of values of η3 in Fig. 5, one can observe that the
difference is always negative, which shows that a longer ”clean relaying” phase is needed when DPC is not
utilized. This is meaningful since clean relaying becomes more crucial when the better transmission technique
(DPC) is not used by T2. Thirdly, we observe that the difference admits a minimum, i.e., (quantitatively, not
rigorously) η(CR20dB)3 admits a maximum for xT2 = 0.2, which coincides with the best location of a relaying
node. In other words, the time allocated to clean relaying (without DPC) is larger at an optimized location
of T2, which is in the interval x ∈ [0.2, 0.3]. Note that this analysis can be corroborated by illustrating the
power consumption during the second and third phase depending on whether DPC is used or not by T2.
D. Comparison of upper and lower bounds
In this subsection we compare the derived inner and outer bounds. We consider a channel with equivalent channel
gains (a, b) = (0.1, 0.9) (c12 = 0.81, c21 = 0.05, cTT = 10, and c11 = 1) with P1 = 10 as an example.9 The
smallest ratio of the first phase under the above setting is η∗1 = 0.3471, which is the shortest interval that T2 is able
9Since here we fix (a, b), changing P2 will cause different H22 due to a simple mapping between (a, b) and {H12,H21,H22}. Therefore,
we do not show the set of H22 to simplify the expression.
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to successfully decode the primary message. Note that to fairly compare the upper and lower bounds, the upper
bound is scaled by 1− η∗1 since the UB is derived for the channel that T2 knows T1’s message non-causally. Note
also that we can not use an η1 which is smaller than η∗1 to be the scaling factor since which is feasible for T2 to
get the primary message. We observe that within P2 = 0 ∼ 50 in linear scale, a gap between the upper and lower
bounds is within 0.3 bits/channel use. That means the proposed achievable scheme is close to the capacity when
the secondary transmitter/receiver is far/close enough to the primary receiver/transmitter, respectively. There might
be two reasons for the existence of such gap. First, the upper bound is derived by neglecting the secure coexistence
conditions, which might introduce some gap. Second, the constraints in the upper bound are much less than the
ones in [21], [31], [32] because part of the constraints are not adopted in our derivation. More specifically, some
of the constraints in [21], [31], [32] can be expressed by auxiliary random variables via simple change of variables
due to the setting that the primary encoder is a deterministic one. But in our model we do not have the constraint
of deterministic encoder at the primary transmitter. By degree of freedom (DoF) analysis with the assumption that
P1 is a finite constant derived in Appendix Appendix VII, we can observe that the DoFs of the derived UB and LB
is 1 and η2 = 1 − η1, respectively, which in general do not match. However, when |cTT | → ∞, η1 → 0 resulting
in η2 → 1, which matches the DoF of UB.
In summary, our numerical results highlight how the secondary user can securely coexist with the primary system
while achieving positive rates for many geographical setups.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated cooperative secure communications in a cognitive radio network where the secondary
receiver is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. Under secure coexistence
conditions we derived the secondary user’s achievable rates and the related constraints to guarantee the primary
user’s weak secrecy rate, when Gelfand-Pinsker coding is used. Then we proposed a multi-phase transmission
scheme to include the phases for clean relaying with cooperative jamming and the latency to successfully decode
the primary message at the secondary transmitter. Additionally, an capacity upper bound of the secondary user
is derived. Numerical results illustrate that the secondary transmitter can improve its performance by optimizing
different parameters for the transmission schemes according to the relative positions of the nodes. We also show
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that the gap between our achievable scheme and a capacity upper bound can be within 0.3 bits/channel use in
tested scenarios. Thereby, a smart secondary transmitter is able to adopt its relaying and cooperative jamming to
guarantee primary secrecy rates and transmit its own data at the same time from relevant geometric positions.
APPENDIX I. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: In the following we perform the reliability and equivocation rate analysis.
Codebook generation: We first generate 2n(RS1+R′S1) independent sequences v1 such that RS1+R′S1 = I(V1;Y1)−
2ε, ∀ ε > 0 as the primary user’s codewords each with probability PV1(v1) = Πni=1PV1(v1i) and label them as
v1(w1, s1), w1 ∈ {1, · · · ,M1}, s1 ∈ {1, · · · , J1}, (42)
where M1 = 2nR1 and J1 = 2nR
′
1 , R′S1 , I(V1;Y2) − 2ε. We then generate 2n(R2+R
′
2) independent sequences v2
as the secondary user’s codewords each with probability PV2(v2) = Πni=1PV2(v2i) and label them as
v2(w2, s2), w2 ∈ {1, · · · ,M2}, s2 ∈ {1, · · · , J2}, (43)
where M2 = 2nR2 and J2 = 2nR
′
2 , R′2 , I(V1;V2) + ε.
Let
C1 , {v1(w1, s1), ∀ (w1, s1)}, and C2 , {v2(w2, s2), ∀ (w2, s2)},
be the codebooks of T1 and T2, respectively.
Encoding: For the primary user to send the message w1, T1 randomly chooses a codeword from bin w1. For the
secondary user to send the message w2, T2 chooses the codeword in bin w2 such that
(v1(w1, s1),v2(w2, s2)) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,V2), (44)
where T (n)ε (PV1,V2) denotes the set of strongly jointly typical sequences v1 and v2 with respect to the joint probability
mass function of V1 and V2, i.e., PV1,V2 . The channel input x is selected by the prefixing P (x|v1, v2). Note that
here we do not choose v1 and v2 simultaneously as [25], but sequentially just like the interference mitigated CR
[23] since T1’s coding scheme is kept intact here.
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Decoding: Decoder U1 and U2 choose (w1, s1) and (w2, s2), respectively, so that
(v1(w1, s1),y
′
1) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′1 ), and (v2(w2, s2),y′2) ∈ T (n)ε (PV2,Y ′2 ), (45)
if such w1 and w2 exist and if these are unique; otherwise, an error is declared. Note that this kind of jointly
typical decoder is the same as the one used for the original U1.
Error analysis: Without loss of generality, assume the messages v1(1, 1) and v2(1, 1) are transmitted. Three
kinds of error should be considered:
E1: T2 cannot find any v2 which is jointly typical to the side information v1. The probability of this error is denoted
by PE1 , Pr((v1,v2) /∈ T (n)ε ), ∀v2.
E2: v1(1, 1) is not jointly typical to y′1 or v2(1, 1) is not jointly typical to y′2. The probability of this error is
denoted by PE2 , Pr((v1(1, 1),y′1) /∈ T (n)ε ∪ (v2(1, 1),y′2) /∈ T (n)ε ).
E3: v1(w1 6= 1, s1) is jointly typical to y′1 or v2(w2 6= 1, s2) is jointly typical to y′2.
For the event E1, from the Covering Lemma [33], as long as R′2 > I(V1;V2), the probability PE1 of this case
approaches to zero when n is large enough. We then consider the decoding error at the primary receiver. From
joint typicality [33] we know that the probability PE2 approaches to zero when n is large enough. For the event
E3, from [33] we know that
PE3 =P{(v1(w1 6= 1, s1),y′1) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′1 )
∣∣(v1(1, 1),v2(1, 1)) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,V2)} ≤ 2−n[I(V1;Y ′1 )−ε]. (46)
Thus the total error probability can be bounded by the union bound as
Pe ≤ PE1+PE2+
∑
w1 6=1
∑
s1
PE3 ≤ PE1+PE2+M1J12−n[I(V1;Y ′1 )−ε] ≤ PE1+PE2 + 2−n[I(V1;Y ′1 )−RS1−R′S1−ε].
(47)
Thus to enforce the upper bound of Pe to approach zero, it is required that
I(V1;Y
′
1) > RS1 +R
′
S1 + ε = I(V1;Y1)− ε,
which can be rearranged as I(V1;Y ′1) ≥ I(V1;Y1).
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For the secondary user, we can follow the same steps to derive the constraint R2 < I(V2;Y ′2) − R′2 =
I(V2;Y
′
2)− I(V2;V1)− ε, which guarantees that the error probability approaches to zero.
Equivocation rate analysis:
The equivocation rate can be further rearranged as
H(W1|Y ′2 )
(a)
≥H(V1)−I(V1;V2)−I(V1;Y ′2 |V2)−H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1)
(b)
≥H(V1)− n[I(V1;V2) + I(V1;Y ′2 |V2) + ε] +H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1)
(c)
=H(V1)− n[I(V1;V2, Y ′2) + ε] +H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1)
(d)
=n[RS1 + I(V1;Y2)− ε]− n[I(V1;V2, Y ′2) + ε]−H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1), (48)
where (a) is from [25, (56)], (b) is from [25, Lemma 3], which is independent to the channel model or coding scheme,
but only relies on the basic definitions of joint typicality, mutual information, and entropy. Thus we can apply this
lemma to our problem; (c) uses the chain rule of entropy again; (d) is due to V1 attaining 2n·(RS1+I(V1;Y2)−ε)
possible values with equal probability from the construction of the code in (42). Then we can rearrange (48) as
RS1 − 1
n
H(W1|Y ′2 ) ≤ I(V1;V2, Y ′2)− I(V1;Y2) + 2ε+
1
n
H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1). (49)
To achieve the weak secrecy, we need to make the RHS of (49) approaches zero. We first choose
I(V1;V2, Y
′
2) = I(V1;Y2). (50)
Then given W1 = w1, we can apply Fano’s inequality to the last term on the RHS of (49) as
H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1 = w1) ≤ 1 + λ · n · I(V1;V2), (51)
where λ is the average probability of error of decoding the index s1 at U2 given V2 and W1. We prove that λ
approaches zero when n is large enough in Appendix II, then we have
1
n
H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1 = w1)
(a)
≤ 1
n
H(V1|Y ′2 ,W1 = w1)
(b)
≤ 1
n
(1 + λnI(V1;Y
′
2)) ≤ ε2, (52)
where (a) is due to conditioning does not increase entropy and (b) is by Fano’s inequality. After averaging over
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W1, we have
1
n
H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1) =
1
n
∑
w1
P (W1 = w1)H(V1|V2,Y ′2 ,W1 = w1) ≤ ε2. (53)
Finally, after substituting (50), and (53) into (49), we have
RS1 − 1
n
h(W1|Y ′2 ) ≤ 2ε+ ε2. (54)
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX II. PROOF OF THE CONSTRAINT THAT λ APPROACHES ZERO
Proof: In this appendix we use the following error analysis to prove λ < ε. Note that now we require that
the primary user’s codeword, which is designed for single user secure transmission, is jointly typical to the new
received signal at U2 when T2 transmits. For a given typical sequence v2, let T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′2 |V2) denote the set of
jointly typical sequences v1 and y′2 with respect to PV1,Y ′2 |V2 . Given W1 = w1, U2 chooses s1 so that
(v1(w1, s1),y
′
2) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′2 |V2), (55)
if such s1 exists and is unique; otherwise an error is declared. Define the event
E(s1) = {(v1(w1, s1),y′2) ∈ T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′2 |V2)}. (56)
Without loss of generality, we assume that v1(w1, 1) is sent and we define the event
K1 = {v1(w1, 1) was sent}. (57)
Then we know with union bound that
λ(w1) ≤ P{Ec(1)|K1}+
∑
s1 6=1
P{E(s1)|K1}, (58)
where Ec(1) denotes the event that (v1(w1, 1),y′2) /∈ T (n)ε (PV1,Y ′2 |V2).
From joint typicality we know that
P{Ec(s1 = 1)|K1} ≤ ε, and P{E(s1 6= 1)|K1} ≤ 2−n[I(V1;Y ′2 |V2)−ε]. (59)
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To find the upper bound of the second term on the RHS of (58), we first check the value of H(V1|V2,W1),
which represents the total number of cases that the decoding is wrong when deriving the total probability of error
similar to (47), i.e.,
H(V1|V2,W1)
(a)
=H(V1|V2)− I(V1;W1|V2)
(b)
=H(V1)− I(V1;V2)− I(V1;W1|V2)
(c)
=n(RS1 +R
′
S1 − ε)− I(V1;V2)− I(V1;W1|V2)
(d)
≤n(RS1 +R′S1 − ε)− n(I(V1;V2)− ε)− I(V1;W1|V2)
(e)
=n(RS1 +R
′
S1)− nI(V1;V2)− [H(W1|V2)−H(W1|V1,V2)]
(f)
=n(RS1 +R
′
S1)− nI(V1;V2)−H(W1|V2) (60)
where (a) and (b) are by the chain rule of entropy; (c) is by definition of V1 sequences, which are uniformly
selected with 2n(RS1+R′S1−ε) possibilities and R′S1 = I(V1;Y2)− 2ε as shown in the codebook construction; (d) is
due to the i.i.d assumption; (e) uses the chain rule of entropy again; (f) uses the fact that when V1 is known, W1
is also known, thus H(W1|V1,V2) = 0.
To proceed, we assume
I(V1;Y2) ≥ I(V1;V2)− 2ε. (61)
This assumption can be interpreted as follows. Given the primary user’s wiretap code, which is fixed, we enforce
each bin has at least one codeword jointly typical to v2, i.e.,
2n[I(V1;Y2)−2ε]2−n[I(V1;V2)+ε] = 2n[I(V1;Y2)−I(V1;V2)+3ε] ≥ 1, (62)
where 2n[I(V1;Y2)−2ε] is the number of codewords per bin and 2−n[I(V1;V2)+ε] is the probability that the codeword
v1 is jointly typical to v2. This implies H(W1|V2) = H(W1), which is the same concept as the wiretap coding.
Thus (60) becomes
H(V1|V2,W1) = n[I(V1;Y2)− I(V1;V2)]. (63)
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Now we can bound the second term of error probability on the RHS of (58) via (59) and (63) as
2n[I(V1;Y2)−I(V1;V2)−2ε]2−n[I(V1;Y
′
2 |V2)−ε] = 2−n[I(V1;Y
′
2 ,V2)−I(V1;Y2)+ε]. (64)
We can see that if (50) is fulfilled, (64) approaches to zero when n is large enough. Now we compare the condition
(50) and the assumption (61). We can express the LHS of (50) as
I(V1;V2, Y
′
2) = I(V1;V2) + I(V1;Y
′
2 |V2)
(a)
≥ I(V1;V2), (65)
where (a) is due to I(V1;Y ′2 |V2) ≥ 0 [34, Th. 2.34]. Then combined with the RHS of (50), we have I(V1;Y2) ≥
I(V1;V2). Therefore, (50) is sufficient to ensure (61) as n→∞, i.e., ε→ 0. Thus to make the probability of error
(58) approach zero, we can find that (50) is sufficient.
APPENDIX III. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: The received signals at U1 and U2 for the three phases are respectively given as
Y
′(1)
1 = V
(1)
1 + Z
(1)
1 ,
Y
′(2)
1 = X
(2)
1 + c21X
(2)
2 + Z
(2)
1 = c
(2)
11 X
(2)
1 + c21(U
(2)
2 +A
(2)
2 ) + Z
(2)
1 ,
Y
′(3)
1 = c
(3)
11 V
(3)
1 + Z
(3)
1 ,
Y
′(1)
2 = c12V
(1)
1 + Z
(1)
2 ,
Y
′(2)
2 = c22X
(2)
2 + c12X
(2)
1 + Z
(2)
2 = c
(2)
12 X
(2)
1 + c22(U
(2)
2 +A
(2)
2 ) + Z
(2)
2 ,
Y
′(3)
2 = c
(3)
12 V
(3)
1 + Z
(3)
2 ,
where φ21 is the phase of c21, X(2)2 = U2 + V1,r + A
(2)
2 , V1,r , e
−jφ21
√
(1− ρ2)γP (2)2 /P1X(2)1 is T1’s signal
relayed by T2, and A(2)2 is the jamming signal in Phase 2. And (V1, V2, U2) have the following relation
V1 = X1, V2 = U2 + αU1, U1 =

c12 + c22e−jφ21
√
(1− ρ2)γP (2)2
P1

V1 = c(2)12 V1, (66)
where U1 is the side information for T2 to precode, X1 ∼ N(0, P1), α = |c22|2PU2/(1 + |c22|2(PU2 + ρ2P (2)2 ))
is the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator of U2 from the channel Y = c22(U2 + A(2)2 ) + N2, where
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A
(2)
2 ∼ N
(
0, ρ2P
(2)
2
)
is the cooperative jamming signal in the second phase, and PU2 = (1− ρ2)(1− γ)P (2)2 . By
the construction of DPC, V1 is independent of U2. In the third phase T2 uses the signaling
X
(3)
2 =
√
P
(3)
2,1
P1
e−jφ21X1 +A
(3)
2 ,
where A(3)2 ∼ N
(
0, ρ3P
(3)
2
)
is the cooperative jamming signal in the third phase. The equivalent noises at U1 and
U2 in phases 1 and 3, respectively, are Z(1)1 = Z1, Z
(1)
2 = Z2, Z
(3)
1 = Z1 + c21A
(3)
2 , Z
(3)
2 = Z2 + c22A
(3)
2 . In the
following we calculate the terms in (8) and (9) individually as
I(V1;Y
(1)
1 ) = log(1 + P
(1)
1 ), (67)
I(V1;Y
(1)
2 ) = log(1 + |c12|2P (1)1 ), (68)
I(V1;Y
′(2)
1 ) = log
(
1 +
|c(2)11 |2P (2)1
1 + |c21|2(ρ2P (2)2 + PU2)
)
, (69)
I(V1;V2, Y
′(2)
2 ) = I(V1;Y
′
2 |V2) + I(V1;V2)
= I(V1, V2;Y
′
2)−
(
I(V2;Y
′
2)− I(V1;V2)
)
= log
(
1 +
|c(2)12 |2P (2)1
1 + |c22|2(ρ2P (2)2 + PU2)
)
, (70)
I(V1;V2) = h(U2 − αV1)− h(U2 − αV1|V1) = log(1 + α2P1/PU2), (71)
I(V1;Y
′(3)
1 ) = log
(
1 +
|c(3)11 |2P (3)1
1 + |c21|2ρ3P (3)2
)
, (72)
I(V1;Y
′(3)
2 ) = log
(
1 +
|c(3)12 |2P (3)1
1 + |c22|2ρ3P (3)2
)
. (73)
Therefore by substituting equations from (67) to (73) into Proposition 1, we obtain Proposition 2.
APPENDIX IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: By the definitions [35]
p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(X;Y ) , sup
{
α : lim
n→∞
P
(
1
n
i(X;Y ) < α
)
= 0
}
,
p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(X;Y ) , inf
{
α : lim
n→∞
P
(
1
n
i(X;Y ) > α
)
= 0
}
,
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where X = [X1, · · · ,Xn] and Y = [Y1, · · · , Yn], the secrecy capacity of a general wiretap channel can be restated
as the following from [30, Corollary 1]
Cs = sup
(U ,X1)∈P0
(
p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(U ;Y1)− p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(U ;Y2)
)
, (74)
where P0 ,
{{UX1}n≥1 : ∀n ∈ N, U → X1 → Y1Y2 forms a Markov chain and 1ncn(X1) ≤ P with
probability 1}, {cn}n≥1 is a sequence of cost functions with cn : X n 7→ R+, and i(X;Y ) = ln p(X,Y )p(X)p(Y ) is the
information density. Here we consider an additive cost constraint [35, Sec. 3.6], i.e., cn(x) =
∑n
1 c(xi). Since the
whole channel is memoryless and for each phase the channel is stationary, we can then rewrite the RHS of (74) as
Cs
(a)
= sup
(U ,X1)∈P0
(
p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
{
i(U (1);Y
(1)
1 ) + i(U
(2);Y
(2)
1 ) + i(U
(3);Y
(3)
1 )
}
−
p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
{
i(U (1);Y
(1)
2 ) + i(U
(2);Y
(2)
2 ) + i(U
(3);Y
(3)
2 )
})
(b)
= sup
(U ,X1)∈P0
(
p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
{
n1
Σ
j=1
i(U
(1)
j ;Y
(1)
1j ) +
n2
Σ
j=1
i(U
(2)
j ;Y
(2)
1j ) +
n3
Σ
j=1
i(U
(3)
j ;Y
(3)
1j )
}
−
p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
{
n1
Σ
j=1
i(U
(1)
j ;Y
(1)
2j ) +
n2
Σ
j=1
i(U
(2)
j ;Y
(2)
2j ) +
n3
Σ
j=1
i(U
(3)
j ;Y
(3)
2j )
})
(c)
= sup
(U ,X1)∈P0
(
p- lim inf
n→∞
{
n1
n
1
n1
n1
Σ
j=1
i(U
(1)
j ;Y
(1)
1j ) +
n2
n
1
n2
n2
Σ
j=1
i(U
(2)
j ;Y
(2)
1j ) +
n3
n
1
n3
n3
Σ
j=1
i(U
(3)
j ;Y
(3)
1j )
}
−
p- lim sup
n→∞
{
n1
n
1
n1
n1
Σ
j=1
i(U
(1)
j ;Y
(1)
2j ) +
n2
n
1
n2
n2
Σ
j=1
i(U
(2)
j ;Y
(2)
2j ) +
n3
n
1
n3
n3
Σ
j=1
i(U
(3)
j ;Y
(3)
2j )
})
(d)
= sup
{(U (k), X
(k)
1 )}∈P
(
p- lim inf
n→∞
{n1
n
I(U (1);Y
(1)
1 ) +
n2
n
I(U (2);Y
(2)
1 ) +
n3
n
I(U (3);Y
(3)
1 )
}
−
p- lim sup
n→∞
{n1
n
I(U (1);Y
(1)
2 ) +
n2
n
I(U (2);Y
(2)
2 ) +
n3
n
I(U (3);Y
(3)
2 )
})
(e)
= sup
{(U (k),X(k)1 )}∈P
({
η1I(U
(1);Y
(1)
1 ) + η2I(U
(2);Y
(2)
1 ) + η3I(U
(3);Y
(3)
1 )
}
−
{
η1I(U
(1);Y
(1)
2 ) + η2I(U
(2);Y
(2)
2 ) + η3I(U
(3);Y
(3)
2 )
})
where in (a) we use the fact that there are three non-overlapped phases and these phases are memoryless and
independent; in (b) we use the memoryless property pY1Y2|U (yn1 , yn2 |un) = Πni=1pY1Y2|X1(y1i, y2i|x1i)·
pX1|U (x1i|ui), and the fact that the distributions are independent; in (c) we introduce nk/nk for each phase for
the ease of the expression in average mutual information in the next step; in (d) we apply law of large numbers:
1
nk
i(U (k);Y
(k)
l ) =
1
nk
∑nk
j=1 i(U
(k)
j ;Y
(k)
lj ) → I(U (k);Y (k)l ) a.s. as nk → ∞, k = 1, 2, 3 and l = 1, 2 and P is
defined in Theorem 2; in (e) we first define ηk , nk/n, k = 1 · · · 3, which are fixed. After substituting ηk, the RHS
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of (d) is independent of n and we can remove the p- lim inf and the p- lim sup operations. For the power constraint,
we can follow steps as in [30, Theorem 3] with discrete approximations to have the average power constraint. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Similar to [23], we first relax the secure coexistence conditions to allow for joint code design for the
primary and cognitive radio users. It results in an interference channel with degraded message sets with additional
secrecy constraints. We start our proof from the result in [31, Lemma 1] [32, (14)], which is an outer bound of a
cognitive radio channel (or, an interference channel with degraded message set) without the coexistence condition
but with secrecy constraints on both primary and secondary messages. The constraint set of the outer bound includes
two parts: 1) a capacity outer bound of a two-user peaceful cognitive radio channel from [32]; and 2) equivocation
rates constraints for each user.
For the expressions of both parts, there are message variables and time sharing variables in the mutual information
expression, which may hinder the simplification of the expression and also the further specialization to AWGN
cases. Especially, [21][31][32] consider a set of joint PDFs where the channel input at the primary transmitter is
a deterministic function of primary message10, by which they can replace the message variable with the channel
input variable without affecting the mutual information and is convenient for further manipulations, e.g., to derive
the UB of AWGN case. The simplified outer bound result is reported in [21, Theorem 1][31, Theorem 1]. However,
there is no such constraint on the relation between the channel input and message at the primary transmitter in our
model. Therefore, we cannot directly use the result from [21, Theorem 1][31, Theorem 1].
In this proof, we re-derive the outer bound for our channel from [31, Lemma 1] as follows. Similar to [31], we
10The reason that even a deterministic encoder is used but the secrecy constraint can be fulfilled is that, they split the primary message
into two parts, one of them is transmitted by the cognitive transmitter which uses a stochastic encoder. And this part of message contributes
a nonzero equivocation rate.
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use the following auxiliary random variables
U , (Z, M1, Q), V , (Z, M2, Q), W , (Z, Q), (75)
where Z , ZQ, Q is a time sharing uniform random variable in the set {1, · · · , n} and Zt , (Y t−11 , Y n2,t+1),
t = 1, · · · , n. Note that constraints in [31, Lemma 1] which are conditioned by {M1, Q} or {M2, Q} are not
considered since which cannot be replaced by the auxiliary random variables in (75). In addition, because we do
not have the deterministic relation between channel input and message at the primary transmitter, we are not able to
replace M1 by X1 without changing the related mutual information in the upper bound constraints, which impedes
the further derivation. With the above criteria to select bounds/constraints from [31, Lemma 1], we can have an
intermediate upper bound as
CDMC1o =
⋃
(Q,M1,M2)→(X1,X2)→Z


(R1, R2, Re1) ∈ R3+ :
Re1 ≤ R1
R1 ≤ I(M1, Z;Y1|Q)
R2 ≤ I(M2, Z;Y2|Q)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(M1;Y1|Z,M2, Q) + I(M2, Z;Y2|Q)
Re1 ≤ I(M1;Y1|Z,M2, Q)− I(M1;Y2|Z,M2, Q)


.
After plugging (75) into R1 and R2, we have
R1 ≤ I(M1, Z;Y1|Q) = I(M1, Z,Q;Y1|Q) ≤ I(M1, Z,Q;Y1) = I(U ;Y1),
R2 ≤ I(M2, Z;Y2|Q) = I(M2, Z,Q;Y2|Q) ≤ I(M2, Z,Q;Y2) = I(V ;Y2),
where the second inequality is due to the chain rule of mutual information with the fact that I(Q;Y1) and I(Q;Y2)
are non-negative; the last equality is by definition of (75). The sum capacity constraint can be derived from (76)
as follows
R1 +R2 ≤ I(M1;Y1|Z,M2, Q) + I(M2, Z;Y2|Q)
(a)
≤ I(X1;Y1|Z,M2, Q) + I(M2, Z;Y2|Q)
(b)
= I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(M2, Z;Y2|Q)
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(c)
= I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(M2, Z,Q;Y2)− I(Q;Y2)
(d)
≤ I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(M2, Z,Q;Y2)
(e)
= I(X1;Y1|V ) + I(V ;Y2),
where (a) uses the Markov chain M1 → X1 → Y1 and the data processing inequality; (b) uses (75); (c) uses the
chain rule of mutual information; (d) uses the fact that I(Q;Y2) ≥ 0; (e) again uses (75).
The equivocation rate is derived as follows
Re1 ≤ I(M1;Y1|Z,M2, Q)− I(M1;Y2|Z,M2, Q)
= I(Z,M1, Q;Y1|Z,M2, Q)− I(Z,M1, Q;Y2|Z,M2, Q)
(a)
= I(U ;Y1|V )− I(U ;Y2|V )
(b)
= I(U,X1;Y1|V )− I(X1;Y1|U, V )− {I(U,X1;Y2|V )− I(X1;Y2|U, V )}
= I(U,X1;Y1|V )− I(U,X1;Y2|V )− {I(X1;Y1|U, V )− I(X1;Y2|U, V )}
(c)
≤ I(U,X1;Y1|V )− I(U,X1;Y2|V )
(d)
= I(X1;Y1|V )− I(X1;Y2|V ), (76)
where (a) is by applying (75); (b) is by the chain rule of mutual information; (c) is by the degradedness condition,
i.e., Y2 is a degraded version of Y1 with respect to X1 such that secrecy can be guaranteed; (d) is due to the Markov
chain U → X1 → (Y1, Y2).
APPENDIX VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: In the following we derive the primary user’s secrecy rate and the secondary user’s rate for AWGN
channels from (39) and (40). We consider the following received signals, which are transformed from the original
one by the same way to generate the standard Gaussian IC for complex cases [18, Appendix A]
Y˜1 = X˜1 + aX˜2 + Z1, Y˜2 = bX˜1 + X˜2 + Z2,
where X˜1 and X˜2 are channel inputs of the primary and cognitive transmitter with average power constraints,
1
n
∑n
i=1 |X˜1,i|2 ≤ P˜1 = |H11|2P1 and 1n
∑n
i=1 |X˜2,i|2 ≤ P˜2 = |H22|2P2, respectively, a , h21h22 ej(−∠h11+∠h21),
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b , |h12||h11| and Z1 and Z2 are circularly symmetric independent complex AWGN variables with zero mean and unit
variances, respectively. The UB of R1 can be first derived by
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y˜1) = h(Y˜1)− h(Y˜1|U)
(a)
= h(Y˜1)− log
(
1 + α(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
(b)
≤ log
(
1 + P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + α(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
, (77)
where (a) is by considering upper and lower bounds of h(Y˜1|U) as follows
h(Y˜1|U) ≤ h(Y˜1) ≤ log 2pie
(
1 + P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
)
,
h(Y˜1|U) ≥ h(Y˜1|U, X˜1, X˜2) = log 2pie.
From the above it is obvious that there exists 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that the following equality is valid
h(Y˜1|U) = log 2pie
(
1 + α(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
. (78)
(b) comes from the fact that Gaussian distribution maximizes entropy given a second moment.
To derive a tight enough upper bound for Re1, we use the same trick as in (78). The UB of the first term of
Re1, i.e., I(X˜1; Y˜1|V ) can be derived by
I(X˜1; Y˜1|V ) = log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log(1 + η|a|2P˜2), 0 ≤ γ, η ≤ 1. (79)
Similarly, we can derive the following expression for I(X˜1; Y˜2|V ) as
I(X˜1; Y˜2|V ) = log
(
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log(1 + δP˜1), 0 ≤ β, δ ≤ 1. (80)
After subtracting (80) from (79), we have
Re1 ≤
(
log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log
(
1 + η|a|2P˜2
1 + δP˜1
))+
. (81)
From (77) and (81) we can derive Rs1 as
Rs1 ≤min{R1, Re1}
=min
{
log
(
1 + P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + α(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
,
(
log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log
(
1 + η|a|2P˜2
1 + δP˜1
))+}
. (82)
37
Two upper bounds of R2 can be derived: similar to (77) we can derive
R2 ≤I(V ; Y˜2) ≤ log
(
1 + |b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
, (83)
and we can derive from the sum-rate constraint
R2
(d)
≤ I(X˜1; Y˜1|V ) + I(V ; Y˜2)−RS1,target
≤ log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1 + η|a|2P˜2
)
+ log
(
1 + |b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
1 + β(|b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
)
− log
(
1 + P˜1
1 + |b|2P˜2
)
,
(84)
where in (d) we exploit the Fourier-Motzkin elimination with the fact that R1 ≥ RS1,target due to the secure
coexistence condition (i). Comparing (83) and (84) concludes the proof.
APPENDIX VII. PROOF OF DOF OF UB AND LB
we identify this fact by deriving the degree of freedom (DoF) of lower and upper bounds to investigate the gap
in between. We consider the case in which P1 is fixed with a finite value and P2 approaches infinity. In this case,
T2 can use η3 → 0 to satisfy the secure coexistence conditions by using a large but finite P (3)2 . The derivation is
as follows. For UB, we can derive the DoF of R2, namely, DoFUB2 , as:
DoFUB2 , lim
P2→∞
RUB2
log P2
(a)
≤ lim
P2→∞
{
log
(
1 + |b|2P˜1 + P˜2 + 2ℜ{bρ}
√
P˜1P˜2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a1)
−
(
log
(
1 + P˜1
1 + |b|2P˜2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a2)
− log
(
1 + γ(P˜1 + |a|2P˜2 + 2ℜ{aρ}
√
P˜1P˜2)
1 + η|a|2P˜2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a3)
)+}/
logP2 (85)
= 1,
where in (a), P˜2 = |H22|2P2 as defined in Theorem 4. In addition, we set β = 0 in Theorem 4 to get (a1). This is
because we need to maximize R2 and if we do not choose β = 0, the first term of the UB of R2 in Theorem 4
will be zero when P2 →∞ since whose numerator and denominator both have the term P˜2. In addition,
lim
P2→∞
((a2) − (a3))+
logP2
= 0,
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no matter γ and/or η are zeros or not. Then it is clear that DoFUB2 = 1.
From (15), the DoF of the LB of R2, namely, DoFLB2 , can also be derived as:
DoFLB2 , lim
P2→∞
RLB2
logP2
≤ lim
P2→∞
η2
(
log
(
1 + |c22|2(1− γ + ρ2γ)P (2)2
)
− log
(
1 + |c22|2ρ2P (2)2
))
log P2
. (86)
Recall that ρ2 is the fraction of the power for jamming. We can observe that when ρ2 = 0 and the constraints (16)
and (17) in the manuscript are fulfilled, DoFLB2 ≤ η2, where η2 is non-zero. This case can happen if T2 helps
the primary user’s secure transmission more in the third phase, e.g., by introducing more jamming power, instead
of using part of P (2)2 to jam U2 in the second phase. From numerical results under high P2, e.g., 40 dB, we can
find that ρ2 = 0 for all positions we considered as in Fig. 2. For normal value of cTT , we have η1 > 0. Because
η2 = 1 − η1 − η2 → 1 − η1, where the last step is due to the assumption of finite P1 which results in η3 → 0
as explained in the beginning of the response to Comment 5, we know that the DoFs of the LB and UB do not
match. However, if |cTT | → ∞, we will have η1 → 0, then η2 → 1, which coincides with the UB.
REFERENCES
[1] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[2] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[3] A. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, October 1975.
[4] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory, Toronto, Canada, 2008.
[5] S. Shafiee, N. Liu, and S. Ulukus, “Towards the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wire-tap channel: The 2-2-1 channel,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 4033–4039, September 2009.
[6] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas-II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov 2010.
[7] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “Information theoretic security,” Foundations and Trends in Communications and
Information Theory, vol. 5, pp. 355–580, April 2009.
[8] J. Laneman, D. Tse, and G. Wornell, “Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 50, no. 12, pp. 3063–3080, December 2004.
[9] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: Cooperation for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp.
4005–4019, September 2008.
[10] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general Gaussian multiple-access and two-way wiretap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative
jamming,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2735 –2751, June 2008.
39
[11] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, March 2010.
[12] F. Gabry, N. Li, M. Girnyk, N. Schrammar, L. K. Rasmussen, and M. Skoglund, “On the optimization of the secondary transmitter’s
strategy in cognitive radio channels with secrecy,” IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 451 – 463, March 2014.
[13] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic, and H. V. Poor, “Interference assisted secret communication,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 57,
no. 5, pp. 3153 – 3167, May 2011.
[14] R. Bassily and S. Ulukus, “Deaf cooperation and relay selection strategies for secure communication in multiple relay networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 1544–1554, March 2013.
[15] T. T. Kim and H. V. Poor, “On the secure degrees of freedom of relaying with half-duplex feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 291–302, January 2011.
[16] J. Mitola, “Cognitive radio an integrated agent architecture for software defined radio,” Ph.D. dissertation, KTH, May 2000.
[17] S. Rini, D. Tuninetti, and N. Devroye, “New inner and outer bounds for the discrete memoryless cognitive interference channel and
some capacity results,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 57, no. 7, pp. 4087–4109, 2011.
[18] ——, “Inner and outer bounds for the Gaussian cognitive interference channel and new capacity results,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 820–848, 2012.
[19] Y. Liang, A. Somekh-Baruch, H. V. Poor, S. S. Shamai, and S. Verdu´, “Capacity of cognitive interference channels with and without
secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 604–619, February 2009.
[20] H. G. Bafghi, S. Salimi, B. Seyfe, and M. Aref, “Cognitive interference channel with two confidential messages,” in Proc. IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications (ISITA), Taichung, Taiwan, 2010.
[21] R. K. Farsani and R. Ebrahimpour, “Capacity theorems for the cognitive radio channel with confidential messages,” Proc. IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2014.
[22] P. H. Lin, F. Gabry, R. Thobaben, E. Jorswieck, and M. Skoglund, “Clean relaying in cognitive radio networks with variational distance
secrecy constraint,” in IEEE Globecom 2014 Workshop - Trusted Communications with Physical Layer Security, Dec. 2014.
[23] A. Jovicic and P. Viswanath, “Cognitive radio: an information-theoretic perspective,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 9, pp.
3945–3958, Sep. 2009.
[24] Y. Chen and A. Vinck, “Wiretap channel with side information,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 395–402, Jan. 2008.
[25] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic, and R. D. Yates, “Discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with channels with
confidential messages: Secrecy rate regions,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2493–2507, June 2008.
[26] K. Azarian, H. El Gamal, and P. Schniter, “On the achievable diversity-multiplexing tradeoff in half-duplex cooperative channels,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 51, no. 12, pp. 4152–4172, Dec. 2005.
[27] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp.
2470–2492, June 2008.
[28] I. P. Mitran, H. Ochiai, and V. Tarokh, “Space-time diversity enhancements using collaborative communications,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 20412057, June 2005.
[29] K. Azarian, H. El-Gamal, and P. Schniter, “On the achievable diversity multiplexing tradeoff in half-duplex cooperative channels,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 51, no. 12, p. 41524172, Dec. 2005.
40
[30] M. R. Bloch and J. N. Laneman, “Strong secrecy from channel resolvability,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 59, no. 12, pp.
8077–8098, Dec. 2013.
[31] R. K. Farsani and R. Ebrahimpour, “Capacity limits for the cognitive radio channel with confidential messages,” available online at
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1207.5040, 2014.
[32] R. K. Farsani, “On the capacity region of the broadcast, the interference, and the cognitive radio channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 61, no. 5, May 2015.
[33] A. E. Gamal and Y. H. Kim, Network Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[34] R. W. Yeung, Information Theory and Network Coding. Springer, 2008.
[35] T. S. Han, Information-Spectrum Methods in Information Theory. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003.
